<u>Abstracts of articles under review or preparation</u>

"Kant's Criticism of Leibniz on the Two Sources of Cognition." (under review)

Kant claims that Leibniz fails to distinguish the two sources of cognition: sensible and intelligible. By characterizing the senses as "confused perceptions" and reducing cognition to intelligible "clarity" only, Leibniz was lead to mistake appearances for things in themselves. Commentators have since shown that Leibniz in fact acknowledges and distinguishes the two sources. However, I show that Kant's criticism is really directed at Leibniz's failure to recognize that the transcendental categories of experience, namely the a priori intuition of space and the concepts of identity and difference, are subjectively constitutive of experience. So it is this failure, not the failure to distinguish two sources of cognition, that led Leibniz to mistake appearances for things in themselves. This clarifies an important difference between the epistemology of the two philosophers; however, I maintain that the failure does not entail a mistake, but rather a disagreement about the nature of space.

"Locke and Leibniz on Moral Doctrine as a Demonstrative Science." (under review)

Leibniz's engagement with Locke on innate practical principles in the *Nouveaux Essais* (1704) provides fruitful insight into the possibility of a demonstrative science of morals. I argue that each of their grounds can be divided into two kinds: (1) principles that are sources of activity or *motivation*, namely instincts, such pleasure and pain; (2) principles that are sources of *justification* or normativity of an action, such as those having to do with divine command, justice, and "pure reason." Making this distinction enables us to clarify Locke and Leibniz's claims for the knowledge and demonstrability of moral doctrine. While it remains difficult to determine exactly *what* principle serves to ground moral doctrine, I show that the endeavor leads Locke into voluntarism, while for Leibniz it leads to the principles of rational jurisprudence, or "the science of right," which he had established in the early *Nova Methodus*. I also suggest how Leibniz combines the principles of sense and reason in an account of virtue.

"An Aristotelian Solution to a Leibnizian Problem about Justice" (in prep)

The aim of this paper is to show how Leibniz may solve a problem about justice by availing himself of Aristotle's analysis of pleasure. The problem is to resolve the apparent conflict between two theses: that human motives are fundamentally egoistic; that justice requires that we act altruistically. Leibniz claims to solve this (in the *Elements of Natural Right*) by defining justice as *love*, and love as *finding pleasure in the good of another*. This solution fails, I claim, since it leaves open whether the motive is egoistic or altruistic. I make this argument against Gregory Brown's claim that Leibniz solves the problem. I then turn to Aristotle's analysis of pleasure, according to which pleasure is a *result*, but not the *end sought* in just actions. Thus Leibniz may claim that the end sought in acts of justice is the good of another, while pleasure is merely the resulting good for oneself. Thus, the altruistic character of justice is retained, while the resulting pleasure makes the act motivationally possible.